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I. INTRODUCTION

When creatives talk about their work, they rarely talk about copyright
or trademarks. Routines of production, sources of inspiration, and
collaborations with colleagues and coworkers figure prominently among
their narratives of their own work-but not the legal framing.' Yet, the
copyright regulation discourse routinely assumes that legal measures are
constitutive for creative production. If there is no legal protection for
*
Senior Researcher, Head of the Research Group Internet Policy and Governance,
Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society, Berlin, Germany.
1. See, among others, JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND
EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (1st ed. 2014); LAURA J. MURRAY ET AL., PUTTING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ITS PLACE 1 (2014).
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creative works, it is assumed creatives will not be able to reap the
benefits. In this situation, creatives would lack incentives to create new
works in the first place, with the result that they would not innovate at all.
This great discrepancy between the dominant copyright discourse and
creators' own accounts presents a challenge for copyright research. The
normative and highly politicized policy debate of the last two decades has
paid rather little attention to the concrete practices of cultural production
and their commercial exploitation. 2 However, in recent years, empirical
research from multiple perspectives has increasingly investigated
copyright's actual effects in the domains of culture and economy: which
creative practices it enables or precludes, and how informal norms and
discourses complement legal regulation.
In addition to prevailing quantitative approaches and emerging
experimental settings, this empirical turn in copyright research has also
been driven by qualitative studies that shed light on the practices,
routines, and norms of creatives and how these relate to legal provisions
such as copyright and patents. 3 The literature on low IP regimes
especially provides instructive insights into the different modalities of
organizing and regulating the production and circulation of creative
goods. In many case studies, scholars have learned that the absence of
formal IP protection does not mean the absence of IP control:
communities such as French chefs, comedians, and magicians have
developed their own set of rules delineating legitimate and illegitimate
practices.4
In sum, there is ample empirical evidence supporting the position that
when seeking to understand the circulation of creative goods there is
always more than law involved: these are informal norms, discourses,
economic rationales, and the technologies underlying creative practices.
These frames may align with copyright provisions, but in many cases they

2. See Mark A. Lemley, Faith-BasedIntellectualProperty,62 UCLAL. REV. 1328, 1330
(2015); Dan Burk, On the Sociology of Patenting, 101 MINN. L. REV. 421, 421-52 (2016)
(discussing discrepancy). See also Ruth Towse, Creativity, Copyright and the Creative Industries
Paradigm,63 KYKLos 461, 461 (2010); CHRISTIAN HANDKE, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COPYRIGHT

(2011); Jeanette Hofmann et al., Kulturgiitermirkte im Schatten des Urheberrechts, 62 Aus
POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE 39, 39-45 (2012); Ruth Towse, The Quest for Evidence on the
Economic Effects of Copyright Law, 37 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 1187, 1187 (2013).
3. SILBEY, supra note 1, at 5; MURRAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
4. See Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property
Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORGAN. SC., 187, 187-201 (2008) (on French chefs);
Dotan Oliar & Christopher J. Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of
IntellectualPropertyNorms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787,
1771-73 (2008); JACOB LOSHIN, SECRETS REVEALED: PROTECTING MAGICIANS' INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY WITHOUT LAW, IN LAW AND MAGIC 123 (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2008). See also
CREATIVITY WITHOUT LAW: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Kate

Darling & Aaron Perzanowski eds., 2017) (discussing a recent paradigmatic case study).
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do not.5 What is still lacking, though, is a theoretical approach to
understand and investigate these phenomena within a systematic and
comparative framework.
This Essay contributes to empirical copyright research by presenting
an integrated governance perspective. This conceptual framework seeks
to enable the identification and comparison of different modes of ordering
and control in creative production and distribution. Based on sociological
institutionalism, this governance perspective does not privilege law exante, but positions norms, discourses, and technology as (analytically)
equally relevant dimensions of copyright governance.
The reasoning of this Essay is presented in three parts. Firstly, I draw
from Murray to argue against a low IP exceptionalism. 6 The norms and
routines ordering creative production in sectors of low IP protection are
not unique to these sectors. Instead, they are constitutive of all processes
of creative production. Norms and routines are not mere replacements for
legal measures in a "negative space of IP." 7 Instead, it is argued that they

are always already present in every form of cultural production and
circulation. Thus, the ordering of creative production and circulation is a
multimodal process that is realized in many dimensions. Secondly, this
perspective is developed into a conceptual framework based on
sociological institutionalism (SI) with four modalities of copyright
governance: (1) a regulative dimension, addressing the provision and
enforcement of formal rules, such as laws, court decisions, terms of
services; (2) a normative dimension, investigating the prevalent
assumptions about legitimate and illegitimate behavior in a specific
community or sector; (3) a discursive dimension, addressing the framings
and debates on creativity, authorship, and originality; and (4) a
technological dimension that investigates the embodiment of affordances
and rules in infrastructures, devices, and algorithms relevant to creative
work. This will allow the empirical study of the impact and mutual
relations of the different modalities across creative sectors. Finally, to
illustrate this concept, the paper discusses the implications of this model
for existing case studies on low IP regimes and other sectors.

5.
6.
7.

See SILBEY, supra note 1, at 81-148.
MURRAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
Elizabeth Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP's Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 317,

317-65 (2011).
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II. BEYOND Low IP REGIMES: THERE'S ALWAYS MORE THAN LAW

A. Low IP Regimes: IP Without Law?
This investigation into heterogeneous modes of ordering creative
production and circulation takes as its starting point the literature on low
IP regimes. In empirical studies, scholars are exploring creative practices
and products that are hardly amenable to formal IP regulation. Studies on
magicians, 8 French chefs, 9 comedians, 10 and roller derby players" have
demonstrated that there is more than law in controlling and circulating
creative work. In the absence of clear-cut legal protection, these
communities have developed norms and routines that delineate
acceptable from objectionable practices, thus bringing about "Intellectual
Property without law." 12 The focus on informal regulation in research
addressing these seemingly disconnected fields stems from their legal
peculiarity: comedy, magic, and cooking are hardly regulated by formal
legal measures. Given this context, stakeholders need to mobilize
different modes of regulation other than law in order to coordinate their
creative practices and products. In these studies, it is community norms
that regulate creative practices and sanction deviant behavior by
measures such as exclusion.
By looking at the fashion industry, Raustiala and Sprigman have given
this perspective a slightly different spin: 13 while this sector is highly
monetized and subject to a considerate number of formal regulations
(e.g., trademark, design patents), they are able to show that the sector
lacks consistent legal rules for its key creative work, fashion design.
Intellectual property rights are not able to effectively delineate between
legitimate inspiration on the one hand and illegitimate plagiarism on the
other hand. 14 However, against all assumptions of conventional IP theory,
"piracy" does not lead to market failure here but to a flourishing,
innovative industry. 15
8. LOSHIN, supranote 4, at 123.
9. Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 4, at 187-201.
10. Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 4, at 1771-73.
11. David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual Property Norms Governing Roller
Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093, 1095-97 (2011).
12. LOSHIN, supranote 4, at 123.
13. Kal Raustiala & Christopher J. Sprigman, The Privacy Paradox: Innovation and
IntellectualProperty in FashionDesign, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1699-1705 (2006); see also Jessica
Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 44-45 (1994); see Susan
Scafidi, IntellectualProperty and FashionDesign, 24 INTELL. PROP. & INFO. WEALTH 115 (Peter
K. Yu ed., 2006); see Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Fromer, Fashion's Function in
IntellectualPropertyLaw, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51 (2017).
14. Raustiala & Sprigman, supranote 13, at 1717-61.
15. Id.
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Scholars have addressed a similar puzzle regarding the trade in TV
formats. 16 The legal protection of formats is arguably very weak, yet there
is a highly profitable global licensing market for formats. Why do
organizations pay to license a format that is not consistently protected?
Why develop new formats if you can free ride on existing ones? Standard
IP theory "would predict that innovators would have no incentive to
innovate in such a market. [. . .] [T]he TV format industry would suffer
from a significant undersupply of TV formats, as constant free riding on
TV format innovation would eliminate incentives to innovate." 17
But producers do invest in new formats. There is not much research
on this topic, but empirical studies and economic theory suggest that a
mix of business strategies, professional practices and community norms
drive the necessary level of innovation in this sector. 18 Similarly to the
fashion industry, imitation as a form of "herding behavior" generates
innovation rather than hindering it. 19 In a multi-method study on
imitation and innovation in game production, we identified similar
strategies and professional norms. 20 Kate Darling has investigated the
strategies of the online adult entertainment industry to cope with a low
level of copyright enforcement. 2 1 Based on qualitative interviews, she has
learned that producers shift towards the production of experience goods
rather than replicable works. 22 Consumer privacy preferences,
consumption habits, low production costs, and a continuing high demand
also help this business to thrive sustainably. 23
In sum, the literature on low IP regimes supports the position that
strong community norms can make up for the lack of formal IP
regulation. This perspective has been extended to more commercial, and
arguably less community-driven sectors, such as fashion, TV formats,
game production, and online adult entertainment. While not constituting
clear-cut low IP regimes, creative production in these sectors is not easily
protected by formal IP regulation, either because it lacks suitable
16. Stefan Bechtold, The Fashionof TV Show Formats, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REv. 451,45162 (2013); see MARTIN KRETSCHMER & SUKHPREET SINGH, EXPLOITING IDOLS: A CASE STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL TV FORMATS TRADING IN THE ABSENCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION

(2010).
17. Bechtold, supra note 15, at 493.
18. Id.; see also Kretschmer & Singh, supra note 15.
19. Bechtold, supra note 15, at 489.
20. Christian Katzenbach et al., Copies, Clones and Genre Building, 10 INT'L J. COMM.
838 (2016); Lies van Roessel & Christian Katzenbach, Address at the 67th Annual Conference
on the International Communication Association: Navigating the Grey Zone: Developers' Views
on Imitation and Inspiration in the Game Sector (May 25, 2017).
21. Kate Darling, IP Without IP? A Study of the Online Adult EntertainmentIndustry, 17
STAN. TECH. L. REv. 709, 709-71 (2014).
22. Id. at 765-69.
23. Id. at 738-58.
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measures to protect the key creative output (fashion, TV formats, games)
or effective enforcement (online adult entertainment). Professionals and
companies in these sectors complement this, not by strong community
norms, but rather by a mix of business strategies, professional norms, and
work routines.
B. Against the Exceptionalism of Low IP Regimes: There's Always
More than Law
This strand of research routinely presents low IP regimes as the
exceptional case; that is, the "negative space of IP" that represents a
puzzle in light of standard theory. 24 Similarly, the strategies in the more
complex examples of fashion, TV formats, games, and online adult
entertainment are regarded as countermeasures to compensate for a lack
of copyright protection and enforcement. Taken together, the literature
tends to consider these sectors as instructive, yet exceptional cases. In
contrast, most creative sectors are well covered by copyright and other IP
regulation, so they do not need informal norms or other complementary
strategies one might argue.
But this position overlooks some constitutive aspects of ordering
creative production and circulation-that there is always more than law.
Low IP regimes are only exceptional cases with regard to their legal
situation. Beyond a "legal centralism," a broad set of empirical studies
and different humanities theories show us that informal norms,
discourses, economic rationales, and technologies of production and
circulation always contribute to framing and ordering creative practices
whether law provides adequate control or not. 25 As Laura Murray and her
co-authors rightly assert, "all creative practices - not merely
extraordinary niches like magic and stand-up comedy - features some
sort of embodied ideas about attribution, custodianship, and fair
practice."

26

Studies on game design and a wide range of other creative practices
indicate that creators always hold strong concepts of their creative
practice and their creative works, sometimes aligning with IP provisions
and sometimes not. 27 In fact, many professionals do not know the
applicable copyright regulations, and many rarely encounter or explicitly

24. Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 317.
25. Fagundes, supra note 11, at 1098.
26. MURRAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 10.
27. For game design, see Tom Phillips, "Don't Clone My Indie Game, Bro": Informal
Cultures of Videogame Regulation in the Independent Sector, 24 CULTURAL TRENDS 143 (2015).
For other creative practices, see MURRAY ET AL., supra note 1. For the mismatch between IP
provisions and Creatives' perspectives, see SILBEY, supra note 1, at 81-148.
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reflect on legal issues in their working routines. 28 David Fagundes' study
on names and branding in roller derby found that informal norms emerge
regardless of existing formal IP measures. 29 In her extensive study on
creative practices in sectors with mostly strong IP coverage, Jessica
Silbey finds strong opinions and informal norms among the interviewees
regarding the creative process and the circulation of the creative output. 30
For different aspects and sectors, Silbey identifies mismatches between
the creatives' own positions and formal IP regulation. Especially
regarding the creative process, the interviews indicate that copyright and
patent law is of very little practical importance. Additionally,
experimental studies indicate that creative practices are motivated by a
wide array of factors, law being one among many. 31
So, there is ample empirical evidence for the position that there is
always already more than law in ordering creative practices and
circulation of creative works. Informal norms and routines do not only
complement law in the absence of formal regulation, but they are always
involved. Yet, how do these different mechanisms and dimensions
interact? How do they mutually reinforce or undermine each other? How
can they be included in a systematic and comparative framework for
investigating the ordering of creative practices and the circulation of
creative works without privileging law ex-ante? This Essay sets out to
contribute to the theoretical advancement of empirical copyright
research. In the following, I suggest building blocks for a holistic
understanding of the governance of creative practices and the circulation
of creative works.

III. A GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE FOR EMPIRICAL
COPYRIGHT RESEARCH

The development of a comprehensive framework for analyzing the
ordering of creative practices and the circulation of creative outputs can
take different approaches with different theoretical underpinnings. One
prevalent and instructive approach is transaction cost economics and its
variations in economic and institutional theory. Another one addresses
motives and incentives on the individual level of creatives and users of
creative products. Psychologically informed research has provided

28. See van Roessel & Katzenbach, supra note 20.
29. Fagundes, supra note 11.
30. SILBEY, supra note 1, at 25-54.
31. Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An
Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (2010); Christopher Buccafusco et al., Experimental Tests of
IntellectualPropertyLaws' Creativity Thresholds, 93 TEX. L. REv. 1921 (2014).
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insight into the reasoning of individuals creating, using and sharing
potentially copyrighted works.
This Essay, in turn, is grounded in sociological institutionalism. The
focus in this perspective is neither on individual motives nor on the
calculation of transaction costs, but on the processes of developing and
contesting shared norms. Put simply, sociological institutionalism is
interested in the ways communities or societies negotiate and establish
shared expectations about legitimate and illegitimate practices. For
copyright research, and specifically for empirical copyright research this
promises to provide a useful theoretical avenue. Building on these
concepts will allow scholars to integrate the different mechanisms of
ordering at play in creative sectors in a systematic and comparative
framework. In contrast to psychological and transaction cost frameworks,
this perspective focuses on the meso- and macro-levels of negotiating and
contesting norms and understanding. It is thus well positioned to integrate
formal regulation on the same level.
Institutions, in this line of theory, are not understood as or restricted
to formal organizations or rules. Instead they are, in a broader sense,
"building-blocks of social order." 32 They manifest themselves in
different forms such as informal norms, daily routines, organizational
procedures, common sayings, but also formal regulations. In essence,
institutions "represent socially sanctioned, that is, collectively enforced
expectations with respect to the behavior of specific categories of actors
or the performance of certain activities. Typically, they involve mutually
related rights and obligations for actors, distinguishing between
appropriate and inappropriate, 'right' and 'wrong,' 'possible' and
'impossible' actions and thereby organizing behavior into predictable and
reliable patterns." 33
This understanding of institutions focuses on the mutual expectations
of social actors and suggests different ways and processes that inform
these expectations. The classification of practices as right or wrong,
appropriate or inappropriate already anticipates the potential of this sort
of institutional theory for the endeavor at hand here. Considering norms,
discourses and technology as potentially functional equivalents to
copyright regulation, this perspective is agnostic to the different possible
modalities of substantiating an institution (i.e., of delineating right or
wrong, appropriate or inappropriate law is but one factor).
An important element in this line of institutional theory is its
sensitivity to less obvious factors of institutionalization. Prominently,
sociologists have stressed the cognitive and discursive dimension of
32.

Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen, Introduction to

BEYOND

CONTINUITY:

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED POLITICAL ECONOMIES 1, 9 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen

Thelen eds., 2005).
33. Id.
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institutions. These dimensions influence behavior not only by normative
guidance and by specifying what one should do, but more fundamentally,
and maybe even more effectively, by specifying what we imagine that we
could do in a given context. 34 In this perspective, institutions do not
primarily consist of "norms and values but [of] taken-for-granted scripts,
rules, and classifications." 3 5
In a recent paper, Dan Burk has analyzed the development and
application of patent law from a similar perspective.36 Based on
sociological institutionalism, he insightfully uncovers the myths and
mythology of patent law. His analysis is based on the cognitive
dimensions of institutions and thus highlights the prevalent social
understandings that bind communities together. Burk argues
convincingly that, as narratives that are "true but not factual," 3 7 myths
contribute to explaining the "puzzle" of the patent law system that has
often been proved ineffective but remains remarkably stable. 38
Starting from the same basis, this Essay takes a different route in
explaining and investigating matters of intellectual property in context.
Burk exclusively focuses on the cognitive dimension of institutions. In
contrast, this Essay follows his call to integrate the other "pillars of
institutions." 39 If successful, this should facilitate a comparative approach
focused on the intersection of and interplay between the different
dimensions. In turn, the object of explanation here is more restricted than
in Burk's paper. Whereas he delivers a meta-analysis of the consolidation
of the patent law system, the framework developed here aims to
investigate the classification of actual practices as either legitimate or
illegitimate with regard to creative works. In other words, this Essay
addresses the governance of creative practices and products. Yet, both are
interested in understanding the role of law in social practices, 40 thus
contributing to an instructive shift in perspective. As Silbey pointed out,
instead of imposing ex-ante "the view that intellectual property
'incentivizes' innovation and creativity, and then showing how IP is not
working as it should, a social science investigation asks the empirical
question that Burk urges we begin to ask with more determination: '[J]ust
1
what roles [are] patents . . . playing?"' 4
34. Lynne G. Zucker, Organizations as Institutions, in 2 REs. Soc. ORGAN. 1 (Sam
Bacharach ed., 1983).
35. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, Introductionto THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 15 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991).
36. Burk, supra note 2.
37. Id. at 429.
38. Id. at 423.
39. Id. at 451.
40. Jessica Silbey, Heuristic Interventions in the Study of IntellectualProperty, 101 MINN.
L. REv. 333, 334 (2016).
41. Id. at 347.
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The model for the empirical study of social practices and the role of
copyright presented here rests on Richard Scott's typology of institutions,
which contains regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive pillars. 42 In
his synthesis of institutional theories, he summarizes that institutions are
"set in motion by regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive
elements." 4 3 From this perspective of shared expectations, mutually
related rights and obligations, and common assumptions about right and
wrong, possible and impossible practices are not only constituted by law
but also by normative orientations and cognitive framings. As these
elements interact, complement, and sometimes conflict with each other
rather than constitute separate entities, I prefer to call them dimensions
instead of pillars. The enduring and coercive impact of institutions then
strongly relies on the coherence of these dimensions, as Marie-Laure
Djelic and Sigrid Quack explain: "the stability, robustness and selfreproducing characters of institutions will be all the more pronounced that
regulative pressures and systems of control combine with normative and
cognitive frames and reinforce each other." 44 Conflicts typically arise
when informal norms and formal law or any other dimension diverge with
regard to evaluating right or wrong, and appropriate or inappropriate
practices.
Turning to copyright, this concept of institutions allows us to develop
a multimodal framework to analyze the governance of creative practices
and products. This framework posits that there is (1) a regulative
dimension, addressing the provision and enforcement of formal rules,
such as laws, court decisions, contracts, and corporate policies. In short,
copyright as usual. But this is only one of many dimensions and not
necessarily a privileged one. There is (2) the normative dimension,
describing the prevalent assumptions about legitimate and illegitimate
behavior in a specific community or sector (i.e., the community norms in
the low IP literature). In addition, institutional theory suggests (3) a
cognitive and discursive dimension, addressing the shared (or contested)
understandings and framings of issues in certain contexts. An example of
the context of copyright relates to the understandings and debates on what
constitutes creativity in the first place, the role of originality, or the
identification of authorship. While not explicitly present in Scott's model
of institutions, it seems reasonable to add (4) a material or technological
dimension that takes into account the affordances and rules embodied in
42.

RICHARD W. SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: IDEAS AND INTERESTS 51 (3d

ed. 2008).
43.

Id. at 49.

44.

MARIE-LAURE DJELIC & SIGRID QUACK, THEORETICAL BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A

RESEARCH

AGENDA

LINKING GLOBALIZATION

AND

INSTITUTIONS,

in GLOBALIZATION

AND

&

INSTITUTIONS: REDEFINING THE RULES OF THE ECONOMIC GAME 15, 20 (Marie-Laure Djelic
Sigrid Quack eds., 2003).
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infrastructures, devices, and algorithms relevant to creative work. Scott
already concedes that artifacts are important "carriers" for sustaining
institutions, 45 but research in Science and Technology Studies (STS) has
shown that technologies and artifacts are more active elements in building
and constituting social order. 4 6 They do more than just "embody and
represent particular constellations of ideas." 47 Road bumps, bridges,4 8
automatic door closers, or heavy tags on hotel keys are the classic
examples in this "sociology of things" that illustrate how artifacts have a
strong impact on the way we move, talk, and interact. 4 9 In this sense,
technology is an institutionalized form of social interactions or structures
that, once institutionalized, have an effect on the social.

RECULAT!V DIMENsION

FIGURE 1: LAYERS OF INSTITUTIONS

This model diverges from prevalent thinking about copyright
regulation in two ways. First, it integrates different modes of ordering
into a coherent framework for empirical research. Thus, it reflects the
findings and arguments stemming from the low IP literature that informal
norms and shared beliefs are always involved in creative practices-not
only in niche sectors. The relation between these dimensions is not set
ex-ante by stating a putative absence of formal regulation and having
norms act as a surrogate. Instead, they operate on equal footing. The
relation between laws, norms, and discourses then is an empirical

45.

SCOTT, supra note 42, at 52.

46.

BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-NETWORK-

THEORY (2007).
47. SCOTT, supra note 42, at 85.
48. Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121, 123 (1980).
49. Bruno Latour, Technology is Society Made Durable, in A SOCIOLOGY OF MONSTERS
103, 104 (John Law ed., 1991).
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question that is amenable to research. 50 Does copyright law prohibit
creative practices that are deemed legitimate within a specific context or
across an entire society? Are the understandings and routines of creative
production in all creative sectors compatible with the categories of
copyright (e.g., authorship, work)? Which creative practices do current
or past technologies enable and promote and which ones are constrained,
or no longer possible? Does this realm of possibilities align well with
informal norms and copyright provisions? In this sense, the legitimacy
and robustness of institutions is dependent on the coherence of these
dimensions. In sum, this model provides an integrative framework for
empirical copyright research that allows us to investigate and compare
formal regulations, norms, discourses, and material-technological
elements as distinct, yet interdependent modes of copyright governance.
The second feature of this model is that it rests on the notion of
governance rather than regulation. While governance as a concept is
"notoriously slippery," it provides analytical value in broadening the
concept of regulation. 5 1 At its core, governance refers to all patterns of
rule, and exploring governance means exploring the construction of
social order and social coordination. 52 Patterns of rule and ordering
mechanisms can take different forms and different trajectories, and thus
the notion of governance resonates well with the institutional framework
presented here. In contrast, the notion of regulation is characterized by
intentional and goal-directed interventions into a policy domain. Julia
Black defines regulation as "a process involving the sustained and
focused attempt to alter the behavior of others according to identified
purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or
outcomes."53 Regulation may take the form of legislation, private selfregulation or multi-actor arrangements; in all cases, however, it links
ordering processes with explicit objectives and measures. Regulatory
actors, private or public, assess their options to intervene in a specific
field and use the means they deem effective to achieve a desired
outcome. 54 Copyright is routinely discussed from a regulatory
perspective. What effects do specific provisions have on creative
practices or consumption behavior? How can copyright be changed in
order to reach desired outcomes? In contrast, the governance perspective

50. With that, it resonates with Burk's call for agnostically trying to understand what IP
really does in practice, not assuming an incentive function (or any other) ex-ante. Burk, supra
note 2, at 452; Silbey, supra note 40, at 347.
51.

JON PIERRE & Guy B. PETERS, GOVERNANCE, POLITICS AND THE STATE 7 (2000).

52.

MARK BEVIR, KEY CONCEPTS IN GOVERNANCE 3 (2009).

53. Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understandingthe Role of Regulation and SelfRegulation in a 'Post-Regulatory' World, 54 CURR. LEG. PROBL. 103, 142 (2001).
54. Jeanette Hofmann et al., Between Coordination and Regulation: Finding the
Governance in Internet Governance, NEW MEDIA & SOC. 1, 13 (2016).
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put forward here focuses on how certain frames and norms constitute,
inform, and question the practices of creative people, as well as users of
creative products. This complements the prevalent regulatory perspective
in important ways, not only because controlling IP involves more than
law but also because the reference points of our actions are not solely
there to guide our creative practices. Shared beliefs, motives, and
legitimizations are not here to regulate our practices; they have emerged
in long-term processes and only sometimes they, implicitly or explicitly,
inform and guide what we do. In sum, this copyright governance model
attributes the ordering and regulation of creative practices to the mutual
reinforcement (or weakening) between regulative, normative, discursive,
and material elements. Some of which are designed to regulate, but many
of which are not.

IV. MODES OF COPYRIGHT GOVERNANCE: REGULATION, NORMS,
DISCOURSE, TECHNOLOGY

This Part illustrates the analytical and empirical value of the proposed
model by spelling out the kind of questions and answers it enables, and
by providing a short application of the model to the governance of
imitation and innovation in game development. This illustrative case
study is based on a multi-method case investigation: a document analysis
of industry handbooks, a discourse analysis of contested cases, and
extensive interviews with different professionals and stakeholders from
the games sector in Germany. We conducted semi-structured interviews
with twenty German game practitioners and four legal consultants and inhouse lawyers, taking about ninety minutes each.
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TABLE 1: MODES AND LEAD QUESTIONS OF
COPYRIGHT GOVERNANCE

Regulative
Dimension

Which actors establish
which rules (scope!)?
How is compliance
monitored and deviation
sanctioned?
How are Rules interpreted
and adapted?

Normative
Dimension

Discursive
Dimension

Empirical
Account

L
LglAy
Policy
et
ProcessPoies

With which normative
expectations are actors
confrntedInterviews,
Ethnographies,
Which expectations are
internalized?PatcporCmey
Observations
How are these norms
established and
negotiated?

What is "taken for
granted"?
Construction o
fraes.ndFrames
frames and perspectives

deconstruction of shared

Discourse
Analyses,
Politicization,
Issue Formation,
Frmsso

Examples
Copyright for
Games, NonDisclosure
Agreements,
Itra
Internal
Corporate
Policies,
Terms of
Service of
Development
Environments

.
Norms within
Communities,
.

Research Questions

French Chefs

Debates
around
"Piracy" and
"Stealing" IP,
Understanding
s of
Authorship
and Creativity

Technological
Dimension

Which rules and
assumptions are inscribed
into technology?
How do services and
algorithms structure and
regulate our creative
practices and our media
usage?

Analyses of
Thnogies
Tering, Diia

Digital Rights
Management,
YouTube'
UploadFiltering
(Content ID),
Development
Environment
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A. Regulative Dimension
The regulative dimension is the one that is most familiar to scholars
of copyright. In addressing the manifest rules and regulations, it is mainly
concerned with laws, contracts, court decisions and other legal
documents. As an institutional element, the regulative dimension
operates essentially in three steps: rule-setting, monitoring, and
enforcement. In this view, institutions are accomplished through "the
capacity to establish rules, inspect others' conformity to them and, as
necessary, manipulate sanctions-rewards or punishments-in an
attempt to influence future behavior." 5 5 Researching this aspect of
governance might be considered business-as-usual for copyright
scholarship, hence this Essay will not go into much detail here.
Investigating this dimension can include both the substance of rules (e.g.,
legal analysis) as well as its emergence and implementation (e.g., policy
analysis).
In the case study, we were interested in understanding how different
modes of governance frame and regulate imitation and innovation in
game production. The production of games is characterized by the fact
that imitation is a common and necessary industry practice that even
spurs innovation. Entire game genres (one can think of platform side
scroller games or first-person shooters) have emerged by remaking and
extending on great games. 56 While the view that imitation is a constituent
part of innovation seems to be shared throughout the industry. Recent
tussles over alleged clones have sparked lively discussions about
legitimate and illegitimate imitation practices in game development.
Interestingly, the legal and regulative dimension is far from providing
a clear-cut answer for "navigating this grey zone." 57 Games are
composed of several elements (rules, graphics, source code, audio), some
of which can be separately protected by intellectual property law. For
instance, the source code and audiovisual elements are protected by
copyright, while game hardware manufacturers often have their
technology patented.s However, a unique part of games compared to
other audiovisual media is the rule-based system. For example, in the case
of chess, it is not the exact colors and shapes of the pieces that define the

55.

SCOTT, supra note 42, at 52.

56.

JESPERJUUL, A CASUAL REVOLUTION: REINVENTING VIDEO GAMES AND THEIR PLAYERS

84 (MIT Press 2012).
57. van Roessel & Katzenbach, supra note 20.
58.

CASEY O'DONNELL, DEVELOPER'S DILEMMA: THE SECRET WORLD OF VIDEOGAME

CREATORS (MIT Press 2014); Arya Tayebi, Interactivity, Immersion and Innovation: Can
Videogames Be Adequately Protected by Copyright Law?, ARYATAYEBI (Feb. 10, 2012),
https://aryatayebi.wordpress.com/2012/02/10/interactivity-immersion-and-ideas-can-videogame
s-be-adequately-protected-by-copyright-law/.
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game, it is the possible moves and affordances of the pieces, the actions
that emerge from these affordances and the interplay between the actions.
Such rule-based systems could arguably be understood as abstract ideas
rather than concrete or fixed expressions. 5 9 As such, games have an
"uncopyrightable core: the actual play of the game." 60 Thus, the longlasting tension between imitation and inspiration in the games sector and
the conflicts around the alleged copying of games is not easily resolved
in the regulative dimension. 6 1
In the interviews we conducted, we were confronted with a striking
neglect of the regulative dimension both with regard to the tension
between imitation and innovation as well as to legal aspects of game
production in general. To put it plainly, the designers, graphic artists and
programmers that produce the games we play every day, and that generate
enormous revenue, neither reflect legal issues in their daily work routines
nor are there regular interactions with legal staff. They seem to operate
with vague, lay concepts of copyright in the back of their minds. When
asked directly, most developers could not assess correctly if a certain
game element was protected by copyright or not, or if a certain practice
crosses the line to infringement. Only in big studios are professional legal
assessments included in the process, but at very late stages when
production is mostly done and marketing kicks in. In sum, the regulative
dimension is not totally absent from creative processes of game
production, but it is certainly in the background.
B. Normative Dimension
The normative dimension addresses values and norms that classify
practices as legitimate or illegitimate and appropriate or inappropriate. In
contrast to the regulative dimension, rules here are neither manifest nor
are they sanctioned by defined punishments. Instead, they are grounded
in shared values and operate as normative expectations: "The
expectations are held by other salient actors in the situation, and so are
experienced by the focal actor as external pressures. Additionally, to
varying degrees, they become internalized by the actor." 62 Typically,
norms are strongly contextual and differ between communities, societies,
and world regions. This dimension of governance operates according to
59.

GREG LASTOWKA, COPYRIGHT LAW AND VIDEO GAMES: A BRIEF HISTORY OF AN

INTERACTIVE MEDIUM (2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2321424; Tayebi, supra note 58.
60. Bruce E. Boyden, Games and Other UncopyrightableSystems, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV.
439, 479 (2011).
61. The assessment of games as objects of copyright and related IP provisions is not key
to the argument of this Essay, so I keep it short. Cf LASTOWKA, supra note 59, at 10; Tayebi,
supra note 58; and Boyden, supra note 60 (analyzing the copyright's application to digital games
and long lists of court cases).
62. SCOTT, supra note 42, at 55.
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a "logic of appropriateness." 63 In this perspective, people do not behave
according to an economic calculus nor to a legal assessment, but they
adjust their actions to what they perceive as appropriate in a certain
situation and context.
To act appropriately is to proceed according to the institutionalized
practices of a collectivity and mutual understandings of what is true,
reasonable, natural, right, and good. Actors seek to fulfill the obligations
and duties encapsulated in a role, an identity, and a membership in a
political community. Rules are followed because they are perceived to be
adequate for the task at hand and to have normative validity. 64
The literature on low IP regimes is strongly based on this perspective
although sometimes the connection is not always drawn. The community
of French chef investigated by Emmanuelle Fauchart and Eric von Hippel
displays typical aspects of normative ordering. 65 Implicit rules and shared
expectations about legitimate and illegitimate practices are established,
such as a prohibition of 1:1 copies, confidentiality, and referencing the
original creator. 66 Noncompliance to these expectations is not sanctioned
by monetary or legal punishments but by exclusion from the community
and from further sharing of expertise. 67 With recipes and original ideas
for the combination of ingredients not being protected by formal IP
provisions but by these informal norms, the normative dimension and the
regulative dimension are not congruent in the case of French haute
cuisine.
Our interview study on game production, similarly revealed
divergence between these dimensions but with a weaker normative stance
and less cohesion within the community. There is consensus between
professionals across the industry that "re-skinning" a game, that is plainly
copying a game and only changing the art style, is an objectionable
practice. Especially if the rule-based system strongly shapes the
gameplay experience, copying the system and merely coating it with
another visual layer is even more illegitimate.
I think it's okay if you just copy the idea ... .] and do your own
game, your own balancing, your own pricing. What is harder or,

63.

JAMES

G.

MARCH

&

JOHAN

P.

OLSEN,

REDISCOVERING

INSTITUTIONS:

THE

ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 23 (1989).

64. Johan P. Olsen, Understanding Institutions and Logics of Appropriateness:
Introductory Essay, ARENA 3 (2007), http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/
arena-working-papers/2001-2010/2007/wpO7_13.pdf.
65. Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 4.
66. Id. at 193.
67. Id. at 195.
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what I think you should not do, or what I don't wanna do myself,
is to take a game and copy it exactly, only change the art stuff. 68
This informal norm runs counter to the regulative dimension, because
copying the game idea and game play does not constitute copyright
infringement as long as you re-program and re-skin the product.
On the other hand, the copyright infringing practice of taking art assets
of classic games such as Super Mario is in many cases considered
legitimate practice, as long as the game developers add interesting twists
to their own game and not merely copy the whole original game.
In sum, the normative dimension rests on cohesive communities and
societies to establish shared norms and expectations. The evocative cases
of the low IP literature are examples of that (French chefs, U.S.
comedians, magicians). In the case of the games industry, we found
community norms to be less strong. This might be no surprise since the
market is vast, global, and highly profitable-which rather hinders the
development of shared norms. Only in the subset of so-called Indie
Developers were strong community norms and beliefs recognizable.
C. Discursive Dimension
The third dimension addressed the ways we understand and talk about
creative practices and products. This does not necessarily imply direct
normative assessment but nonetheless shapes our thinking and doing. In
Scott's institutional theory, this dimension is denoted as the "culturalcognitive pillar" of institutions. 6 9 In that view, "compliance occurs in
many circumstances because other types of behavior are inconceivable;
routines are followed because they are taken for granted as "the way we
do these things." 70 In contrast to the regulative and the normative
dimension, practices here are not explicitly classified as legitimate or
illegitimate. We just take certain things for granted, and routinely follow
these assumptions.
Dan Burk's paper on the sociology of patenting addresses this
dimension. 71 When he refers to Mircea Eliade's definition of myths as
narratives that are "true but not factual," he exactly refers to the enduring
quality and impact of widely shared beliefs that are deeply embedded in
social routines and structures, so that questioning them is a hard job, even
with good reasons.7 2
68.
employee,
69.
70.
71.
72.

Material from interview study, INT17-S-M (Interviewee No. 17, S=large studio
M-manager).
SCOTT, supra note 42, at 56.
Id. at 58.
Burk, supra note 2.
Id. at 429; MIRCEA ELIADE, MYTH AND REALITY (1963).
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In this Essay, I rename this dimension as discursive dimension,
because communication and discourses are the medium in which these
beliefs and frames can be identified. With "piracy" and "stealing" on the
one hand, and "sharing" on the other, the copyright debates are replete
with examples for discursive struggles over the ways we should
understand and frame the changing practices of media and culture. While
most scholarship addresses these debates only as prelude or as
independent variable for the real thing, copyright reform and
legislation,7 3 an institutional understanding of governance, suggests
taking the discursive dimension seriously in its own right: words matter!
The brilliant works by Martha Woodmansee 74 and Mark Rose 75 on the
emergence of the author-concept and its important impact on the
consolidation of copyright as a legal instrument point to another aspect
of this dimension. The regulative as well as the normative dimension are
strongly dependent on the discursive dimension. Here, subjects and
categories are constructed, and only on these grounds normative and
regulatory provisions can operate. How do we come to privilege the
author over the paper factory with regard to a book? Why do we take the
idea of a self-contained work for granted, although we know that we all
stand on the shoulders of giants? 76
With regard to our interview study, I highlight three strong currents in
this dimension. The first concerns creators' understanding of game
design. All game professionals interviewed hold that game production is
a highly collaborative process, full of mutual imitation and references.
Devising new games always and necessarily includes great portions of
existing ideas. Indeed, for a new game to become a good game,
professionals argue that you should not innovate on all levels of game
design; otherwise players would be confused and unable to play the game.
Instead, remixing existing elements and giving the game an original twist
is considered a good game design: "A lot of time it's more about picking
the right ingredients that are already there. I mean, 95% of what we do
always [already] exists somewhere." 77

73.

Cf SEBASTIAN HAUNSS, CONFLICTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY: THE CONTENTIOUS

POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2013).

74. Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions
of the Emergence of the 'Author,' 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984).
75. Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor:Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of
Modern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51 (1988).
76.

ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND

PRACTICE 52 (2012) (Regulatory theory has somehow included this into its concepts by
acknowledging that "the underlying ideas [... .] and the broader intellectual climate that regulat[es]
instruments" - but again, are only a prelude to "serious" regulation).
77. Material from interview study, INT12-I-0 (Interviewee No. 12, I-independent studio,
0-owner).
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The second aspect concerns game professionals' self-concept as
creatives. Almost all interviewees, whether working as independent game
developers or as employees in a big studio, considered themselves as
creative professionals, thus aiming for producing something new and
original in their daily job. This self-concept has ramifications for the
tension between imitation and innovation discussed here. Even if the
management demands replicas of successful games by competitors, the
developers are guided by strong intrinsic motivations to include original
elements in the new game. As one interviewee put it: "I always try to
smuggle something in." 7 8
A third element in this dimension stemming from the interviews is a
strong understanding of authorship in a subset of the interviewees. Indie
developers articulate a strong identification with their work. They
consider the developed games as "theirs," as personal expressions. They
understand the games they produce not foremost as commercial products,
but as "heart projects." Some of the indie developers who were
interviewed classified their games as "Autorenspiele," a german notion
used to highlight the stronk between author and game.
D. Technological Dimension
The fourth dimension in this copyright governance model is the
material-technological layer. The services and devices we use in our
private and professional lives enable and at the same time, constrain the
range of actions we pursue. From an institutional perspective, they
contribute to ordering the social jointly with regulative, normative and
discursive elements. As John Law writes, "[m]achines, architectures,
clothes, texts - all contribute to the patterning of the social." 79 In this
dimension, to put it plainly, the distinction between right or wrong, and
appropriate or inappropriate, is translated into possible or impossible.
In the broader field of Internet Governance, Joel Reidenberg and
Lawrence Lessig made a similar argument in the late 1990s:
Law and government regulation are [. . .] not the only source of
rule-making. Technological capabilities and system design choices
impose rules on participants [. . .]; the set of rules for information
flows imposed by technology and communication networks form
a "lex informatica." 8 0

78. Material from interview study, INT22-S-GA (Interviewee No. 22, S=large studio
employee, GA-graphic artist).
79. John Law, Notes on the Theory of the Actor-Network: Ordering, Strategy, and
Heterogeneity, 5 SYs. PRAc. 379, 382 (1992).
80. Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formation of Information Policy Rules
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For this perspective, Lawrence Lessig has coined the catch phrase
"Code is Law." 8 1 That line of argument always runs the risk of falling
into the trap of technological determinism; but if integrated into an
institutional perspective, it provides an instructive impulse into our
thinking about how creatives work and how products are regulated and
framed.
This dimension is of particular importance for copyright research.
Digital Rights Management is an obvious example for the direct
delegation of regulatory functions to the technological dimension. These
systems try to translate strictly the legal or illegal distinction into possible
or impossible actions on our devices and services, with sometimes
frustrating and bewildering results. While DRM in the pay-per-download
market for music has been too inconvenient to succeed, it is today so
tightly integrated into many services we use daily that we barely
recognize them (e.g., streaming). Upload filtering technologies combined
with IP rights databases such as YouTube's ContentlD, similarly
constitute ordering processes on the technological layer. Algorithms sift
through every uploaded video and identify audio snippets that match
items in their IP database. As a default, every match is a potential
copyright infringement, notwithstanding possible fair use practices and
other restrictions of copyright claims. In effect, these systems tend to
over-block content by removing works that are not infringing at all.
Turning to the case of imitation and innovation in game production,
this dimension addresses the technological infrastructure of game
development. Programmers and graphic artists routinely use software and
programming environments that provide huge libraries and modules to
help them build the game. No new game is technically built from scratch.
In effect, the specific degree of imitation and innovation is strongly
dependent on the technologies and their affordances. Level design, game
engine, as well as control of the game character are regularly adopted
from existing games-not only the concepts but also the implementation.
In sum, the technological layer is one dimension where the
governance of creative production and consumption is situated. Like
other institutional elements, it does not determine practices, but enables,
constrains, and nudges people into one direction, and it hides alternatives.

through Technology, 76 TEx. L. REv. 553, 554-55 (1998).
81. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
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V. A MODEL FOR COMPARATIVE COPYRIGHT RESEARCH
A. Comparing Modes of Governance Within a Sector
In analytically distinguishing different modes, discussion of their
interplay sometimes gets neglected. The key analytical and empirical
value of the proposed governance model is to investigate the relation
between these dimensions and their respective effects. The actual relation
between laws, norms, discourses, and possibly technological affordances
in a specific context is an empirical question that is amenable to research.
Turning to our case study on game production, I have already
highlighted several differences in the evaluation of game design practices
in Part IV of this Essay. In Table 2, I summarize and compare the
evaluations across the four dimensions and two practices: re-skinning and
retro or hommage games.
TABLE 2: COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF
GAME DESIGN PRACTICES
(LEGITIMATE PRACTICE AND ILLEGITIMATE PRACTICE)
Regulative

Re-Skinning

* e Ifcreative

Hommage/R
etro

Normative

Discursive

p

No infringement

a a

Technology

re mathe
legitimate

Creative
work

Re-use of
elements

White box: legitimate practice; Dark box: illegitimate practice

Re-skinning refers to re-producing a (often successful) game by
copying the logic and mechanics of a game and only changing the art
style. From a legal perspective, this is in most cases a non-infringing
practice. As long as graphics and sounds are substantially altered, and the
software code is re-written, this does not violate copyright or other legal
provisions. In contrast, the normative evaluation within the game design
community strongly rejects this practice. Looking at re-skinning from the
discursive perspective, this is not only considered a normatively
objectionable practice, game designers more fundamentally refrain from
categorizing this a creative practice in the first place. From a
technological perspective, re-skinning is not effortless-all material
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elements (graphics, sounds, software code) need to be redone so not to
infringe upon the original.
A contrasting case is the production of hommage or retro games.
Popular especially in the context of independent developers is the
production of games that allude to iconic games, often from the 1980s or
1990s, such as Super Mario Brothers. Typically, game designers take the
characters and maybe soundbites from these old games and produce new
games with a different game-play and narrative. From a legal perspective,
this regularly constitutes copyright infringement, since developers
include the original, thus protected characters or very close adaption, and
integrate iconic graphic elements or soundbites. 82 Yet, from the
developer community's normative point of view, this does not violate
community norms as long as the game constitutes a creative remake of
the original (e.g., by performing a gender-swap of the main characters or
giving the game a different twist in game play). 83
These short examples illustrate the analytical and empirical value of
this model. Depending on the object of study, the four governance
dimensions afford and support different creative and economic
practices-and in many cases, they are not congruent. Regulative
provisions diverge with normative assumptions in a community, and
public discourse is at struggle with practices enabled-and maybe even
nudged-by new technologies. This is not only true with game designers.
The same is true for the mismatches identified by Jessica Silbey, 84 and
also for the community norms in low IP regimes. Similar to the game
designers, both French chefs and comedians seem to value greatly the
underlying idea of their creative works. Thus, the informal ownership
claim put forward by creatives in these sectors encompasses game play
and mechanics (game designers), the combination and preparation of
ingredients (French chefs) and the core structure of a routine and joke
(comedians)-elements that are typically not protected by copyright as
they are considered ideas rather than works. The analytical framework
presented here thus allows us to identify these mismatches and to discuss
possible reactions, if necessary.

82. See Maria B. Garda, Nostalgia in Retro Game Design, DIGRA (2013)
http://www.digra.org/wp-content/uploads/digital-library/paper3 10.pdf (for the common practice
of remixing popular video games); see LASTOWKA, supranote 59; and Boyden, supra note 60 (for
a general copyright assessment of video games and their elements).

83.

Id.

84.

SILBEY, supra note 1, at 81.
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B. Comparing Modes of Governance Across Sectors
This model also allows copyright and IP scholars to compare models
of governance across sectors. In the discussion of low IP regimes and
other sectors, we have seen that the impact and salience of different
modes of governance varies: in the case of French chef and comedians,
for example, informal norms appear as the main governance mode. 85 In
game design, norms have emerged as a relevant mode as well, but
regulative, discursive, and technological aspects also contribute to the
ordering of creative practices. In other sectors, copyright legislation and
licensing contracts might well provide for creative practices and outputs.

TABLE

3:

COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNANCE
MODES ACROSS SECTORS
(STRONG IMPACT, AVERAGE IMPACT, AND WEAK IMPACT)

Regulative

Normative

Discursive

Technology

Sector A
Sector B

Black box: strong impact; Grey box: average impact;
White box: weak impact

The schematized comparison of sectors in Table 3 illustrates the
analytical value of the proposed governance model. Prevalent copyright
research presumes a strong impact of law, ideally incentivizing
innovation-and then concludes, allegedly with surprise, that "IP is not
working as it should" 86 or that some sectors represent a "negative space
of IP."

87

This is because copyright researchers tend to focus on law and

other legal instruments, but in the context of the presented model, this is
but one dimension. In consequence, the model allows us to comparatively
address the respective impact of different governance modes: regulation,
norms, discourses, and technology. It turns the assumption of copyright
and IP scholarship and policy (that IP (a) has impact on creative practices

85.

86.
87.

Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 4, at 187-201.
SILBEY, supra note 1, at 347.
See Rosenblatt, supra note 7.
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and (b) incentivizes innovation) into an empirical question8 8 : What is the
impact of IP on creative practices in relation to norms, discourses and
technology? Does it hinder or promote innovation? What is considered
innovation in the first place? Only by bringing different modes of
governance into relation, instead of isolating regulative means, we start
to fully understand the interaction between creative practices.
VI. DISCUSSION
This Essay has set out to develop a multimodal concept of copyright
governance. In a nutshell, it emphasizes the point that there is always
more than law in controlling IP, not only in low IP regimes. Building on
institutional theories, I suggest four modes of copyright governance:
(1) A regulative dimension, addressing the provision and enforcement of
formal rules such as laws, court decisions, and terms of services; (2) a
normative dimension, investigating the prevalent assumptions about
legitimate and illegitimate behavior in a specific community or sector;
(3) a discursive dimension, addressing the framings and debates on
creativity, authorship, and originality; and (4) a technological dimension
that investigates the embodiment of affordances and rules in
infrastructures, devices, and algorithms relevant to creative work.
In analytically distinguishing different modes, discussing their
interplay sometimes gets neglected. But that is exactly the core idea of
this governance model-ordering takes place when these dimensions
reinforce each other, but also when they contest each other. Especially in
the context of copyright, divergence between these dimensions has been
obvious in recent years. Technologies strongly nudge users towards
infringing behaviors; norms prevalent in many communities do not fit
well within the formal IP regulations.
The illustrative case study on imitation and innovation in games
production similarly has shown incongruences between the dimensions.
While legal regulation allows for re-skinning of games, the developers
consider that a bad and objectionable practice.
The empirical value of this model is that it allows for comparative
approaches. It allows comparison of the empirical impact and specific
effects of the respective dimensions not only within one sector, but also
across sectors. From this perspective, the prominent low IP sectors can
be characterized by a low level of formal IP regulation but a high level of
informal normative expectations. The governance of content on online
platforms, such as YouTube or Facebook, constitutes a promising
example for future case studies. On the regulative dimension, we might

88.

Cf Burk, supranote 2, at 452; Silbey, supra note 40, at 347.
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expect a shift from public law to contractual elements such as Terms of
Service, and Community Guidelines. Similarly, we seem to experience a
shift towards regulation on the technological dimension, given the
massive amount of content that these platforms host and the increasing
political pressure for taking accountability for this content. As a
consequence, the platforms have implemented filtering mechanisms.
I hope to stimulate the discussion on theoretical aspects of
interdisciplinary copyright research with this Essay. The literature on low
IP regimes has given many impulses for extending our understanding of
how creative work is ordered and framed. This Essay tries to develop that
line of thinking into a coherent framework that integrates diverse modes
of ordering without privileging one over the other. The specific impact of
the respective modes is an empirical question. I hope the copyright
governance model put forward here can contribute to answering this
question.

